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Abstract
A discrete function of n variables is a mapping g : X1 × . . . ×Xn → A, where X1, . . . , Xn, and
A are arbitrary finite sets. Function g is called separable if there exist n functions gi : Xi → A for
i = 1, . . . , n, such that for every input x1, . . . , xn the function g(x1, . . . , xn) takes one of the values
g1(x1), . . . , gn(xn). Given a discrete function g, it is an interesting problem to ask whether g is
separable or not. Although this seems to be a very basic problem concerning discrete functions, the
complexity of recognition of separable discrete functions of n variables is known only for n = 2. In
this paper we will show that a slightly more general recognition problem, when g is not fully but only
partially defined, is NP-complete for n ≥ 3. We will then use this result to show that the recognition
of fully defined separable discrete functions is NP-complete for n ≥ 4.
The general recognition problem contains the above mentioned special case for n = 2. This case
is well-studied in the context of game theory, where (separable) discrete functions of n variables are
referred to as (assignable) n-person game forms. There is a known sufficient condition for assignabil-
ity (separability) of two-person game forms (discrete functions of two variables) called (weak) total
tightness of a game form. This property can be tested in polynomial time, and can be easily gen-
eralized both to higher dimension and to partially defined functions. We will prove in this paper
that weak total tightness implies separability for (partially defined) discrete functions of n variables
for any n, thus generalizing the above result known for n = 2. Our proof is constructive. Using
a graph-based discrete algorithm we show how for a given weakly totally tight (partially defined)
discrete function g of n variables one can construct separating functions g1, . . . , gn in polynomial
time with respect to the size of the input function.
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1 Introduction
A discrete function of n variables is a mapping g : X1 × . . . ×Xn → A, where X1, . . . ,Xn, and A are
arbitrary finite sets. Discrete function g is called separable if there exist n separating functions of one
variable each, gi : Xi → A for i = 1, . . . , n, such that
g(x) = g1(x1) or . . . or g(x) = gn(xn) for every input x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn.
To see some simple examples for separable and non-separable discrete functions consider the following
discrete functions of two variables. For n = 2 we can interpret a discrete function as an array, where the
rows are indexed by X1, the columns by X2, and the entries of the array are the g(x1, x2) ∈ A values
for x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2.
[
a b
c d
]  a a ca b b
c b c

 [ a b c
b c a
] [
a a b b
c d c d
]  a a ba a c
b c b

 (1)
The first two examples are clearly separable (we leave to the reader the easy task of defining the
two separating functions, i.e. of assigning the correct values to rows and columns) while the last three
examples are not (which is easy to prove by picking an entry in the array, assigning this value first to
the corresponding row and then to the corresponding column, and following in both cases the sequence
of forced assignments to a contradiction).
The concept of separability can be naturally extended to partially defined discrete functions of n
variables by requiring the above property only for those inputs for which the function is defined. Note
that the separating functions can be always assumed to be fully defined - indeed if a set of n partially
defined separating functions fulfills the above condition, then so does any completion of this set to fully
defined functions. Several concepts of decomposability for partially defined Boolean functions (a special
subclass of discrete functions) are surveyed, for example, in [3].
Although discrete functions are a general concept found in many areas of discrete mathematics, our
motivation and interest in studying them came from game theory, and so we will in the rest of this
paper switch to the standard game theoretical terminology. We denote by I = [n] = {1, . . . , n} the set
of players, by Xi the set of strategies of player i ∈ I, and by A the set of possible outcomes. A discrete
function g : X1× . . .×Xn → A of n variables is called an n-person game form. In other words, once all
players chose a particular strategy, say xi ∈ Xi for i ∈ I, then g(x1, ..., xn) denotes the corresponding
outcome of the game. The vector of the chosen particular strategies, x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn
is called a strategy profile. In case g is separable, the separating function gi assigns an outcome to every
strategy of player i, and so in this context the term assignability (or property AS in short) is used
instead of separability.
The problem studied in this paper can be formulated as follows: given an n-person (partially defined)
game form (an n-variate discrete function) decide whether it is assignable (separable). We shall see in
Section 3 that this problem is solvable in polynomial time for n = 2 and that it is computationally hard
for n ≥ 3 for the partially defined case, and for n ≥ 4 for the fully defined case. In those situations
when recognizing assignability is difficult, it makes sense to look for conditions that (i) are sufficient for
assignability and (ii) can be tested in polynomial time. Such conditions will be studied in Section 2.
First, let us recall results related to the case of two players. This case has been most studied and best
understood so far.
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1.1 The two-person case
Since assignability is obviously a hereditary property (any subform of an assignable game form, induced
by subsets of the strategy sets of the players, is obviously also assignable), a natural question arises,
whether assignable game forms admit a characterization by a finite set of forbidden subforms. Interest-
ingly, this is not the case already for two-person game forms, as the following infinite family (from [2])
of non-assignable game forms demonstrates it:

 a b ac a b
b b a




a b a a
c a b a
c b a b
b b b a




a b a a a
c a b a a
c b a b a
c b b a b
b b b b a

 · · · (2)
It is not hard to see, that each such game form is not assignable, while a removal of any row or
column makes it assignable, i.e. the presented game forms are minimal non-assignable. On the other
hand, it can be shown [2], that if assignability is made more restrictive by requiring that every strategy
profile is covered by exactly one of the players (either g(x1, x2) = g1(x1) or g(x1, x2) = g2(x2) but
not both), then such strong assignability can be characterized by a finite set of minimal non-assignable
game forms. Note also, that any two person game form with at most two outcomes is clearly assignable
(assign one outcome to all rows and the other outcome to all columns), and hence the game forms in (2)
use the minimal number of three outcomes needed for non-assignability.
This observation can be generalized to the case of n players: any n-person game form with at most
n outcomes is clearly assignable, and it is easy to construct non-assignable n-person game forms with
n + 1 outcomes. Such a construction proceeds as follows. Take an m×m× · ×m game form, and for
each of the first n outcomes select m strategy profiles (thus we need nm < mn to have enough strategy
profiles) such that no two of them share any coordinate value. In the two player case these are two
permutation submatrices, in (2) the main diagonal with outcome a and the diagonal above it plus the
bottom left corner with outcome b. Each of thesem-tuples of strategy profiles requiresm different player
strategies to cover all m outcomes. For each outcome k we need gi(xj) = k for m distinct pairs (i, j)),
and so altogether they use all nm available strategies gi(xj). Hence, putting the last outcome n+ 1 to
any still ”vacant” strategy profile causes the game form to be non-assignable. Let us finally remark,
that this construction works for any n and m such that nm < mn, but to make such a game form
minimal non-assignable is probably a very tricky task (we do not see any easy way how to generalize
the construction of minimal non-assignable game forms to any n > 2).
Several other properties of two-person game forms which are connected to assignability were studied
in the literature. An important property is tightness. We say that a player can guarantee a subset B ⊆ A
of outcomes, if he/she has a strategy such that no matter what strategy the other player chooses, the
corresponding outcome belongs to B. A two-person game form g : X1 × X2 → A is called tight (has
property T , in short) if for any subset B ⊆ A either one player can guarantee B or the other player can
guarantee B¯ = A \B. Note that both of the above cannot happen, while there may be a subset B ⊆ A
in a non-tight game form such that neither player 1 can guarantee B, nor player 2 can guarantee B¯.
The importance of tightness stems partly from the fact that it is in the two player case equivalent to
Nash-solvability of a game form [7, 8, 9], which is a pivotal concept in game theory. No polynomial time
algorithm for verifying tightness is known, however a quasi-polynomial one was suggested by Fredman
and Khachiyan in [5].
Another property of game forms related to tightness is total tightness. A two-person game form
g : X1×X2 → A is called totally tight (TT ) if every 2×2 subform of g (which is a two-dimensional array
in this case) is tight, or equivalently, if it contains a constant line (i.e. row or column). More precisely,
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let us call g′ : X ′1×X
′
2 → A to be a 2×2 restriction of g if X
′
1 = {x1, x
′
1} ⊆ X1 and X
′
2 = {x2, x
′
2} ⊆ X2
are 2-element subsets of X1 and X2. Then g is TT if for every 2× 2 restriction g
′ of g we have
g′(x1, x2) = g
′(x1, x
′
2), or g
′(x1, x2) = g
′(x′1, x2), or g
′(x′1, x
′
2) = g
′(x′1, x2), or g
′(x′1, x
′
2) = g
′(x1, x
′
2).
It was shown in [4] that totally tight two-person game forms are both tight and assignable. It is easy
to observe, that checking whether a two-person game form is TT can be done in polynomial time, as
there is only a polynomial number of 2× 2 subforms to check (this easy fact was observed e.g. in [1] ).
Thus property TT provides a simple sufficient condition for the assignability of two-person game forms.
1.2 The n-person case for n ≥ 3
As we shall recall in Section 3 that assignability of two-person game forms can be tested in polynomial
time. A natural idea is to try to reduce the assignability of higher dimensional game forms to the
two-dimensional case by considering projections. Let g : X1 × . . .×Xn → A be a n-person game form.
An i-th two dimensional projection gi of g is a two person game form where the set of strategies of the
first player consists of the strategies of player i and the set of strategies of the second player is the direct
product of all the strategies of the remaining n− 1 players. Is it true that g is assignable if and only if
gi is assignable for every i? Unfortunately not. Both implications fail already for n = 3. First we shall
show an example of a 3 × 3 × 3 three-person game form which is not assignable, but each of its three
two-dimensional 3× 9 projections is assignable. The game form is given in Figure 1.
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
4
0
5
0
0
8
0
9
0
0
0
0
7
Figure 1: A non-assignable 3D example.
Clearly, this three person game form is not assignable as there are 10 outcomes but only 9 values
to be assigned. On the other hand, each of the three two-dimensional projections is a 9× 3 two-person
game form which is assignable by assigning 0 to all three columns and assigning outcomes 1 to 9 to
the rows (note that each row contains exactly two 0’s and exactly one other outcome in each of the
three projections). Second we shall show an example of a 3 × 3 × 3 three-person game form which is
assignable, but none of its three two-dimensional projections is assignable. The game form is given in
Figure 2. In this example the symbol ∗ stands for an arbitrary outcome from the set {a, b, c}. Since
there are only three outcomes, the three-person game form is trivially assignable by assigning outcome
a to planes orthogonal to direction 1, outcome b to planes orthogonal to direction 2, and outcome c to
4
cb
a
a
c
b
∗
a
c
∗
∗
b
∗
∗
c
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
c
∗
∗
a
∗
∗
∗
Figure 2: Assignable 3D example that has no 2D assignable projection, where symbol ∗ can be any of
a, b or c.
planes orthogonal to direction 3. On the other hand, each of the three 9×3 two-dimensional projections
is a game form that contains a 2× 3 subform
[
a b c
b c a
]
which is not assignable, and hence none of the projections is assignable (note that this 2× 3 subform is
the middle example in (1)).
Therefore, to obtain sufficient conditions for assignability for n ≥ 3 we need to look at other prop-
erties of game forms, e.g. generalizations of the properties studied in the two-person case.
The concepts of tightness and total tightness can be extended to the general n-person case in the
following way. Given an n-person game form g : X1 × . . .×Xn → A and a partition I = K ∪K of the
players into two complementary non-empty coalitions, the two-person game form gK : XK×XK → A is
defined as follows. The strategies of the first and second players are the elements of the direct products
XK =
∏
i∈K Xi and XK =
∏
i∈K Xi, respectively. For x ∈ XK and x ∈ XK we define g
K(x, x) = g(y)
where y originates from x and x by concatenating them and reordering the coordinates according to
the X1, . . . ,Xn order. An n-person game form g is called tight (respectively, totally tight) if g
K is tight
(respectively, totally tight) for all non-empty K ⊆ I.
Similarly, we call g weakly tight (respectively, weakly totally tight if gK is tight (respectively, totally
tight) for all K ⊆ I such that |K| = 1. Note, that in this case we consider exactly the two-dimensional
projections defined above in the first paragraph of this subsection. We shall denote these concepts by
WT andWTT , respectively. Let us remark that, by the above definition, T =WT and TT =WTT for
n ≤ 3. Indeed, in this case for any non-trivial partition one of the two coalitions contains only one player.
Let us also remark, that the above defined concepts (T , WT , TT , and WTT ) can be straightforwardly
extended to partially defined game forms by replacing all undefined values of the game form by a single
extra outcome, and by requiring the corresponding property for the resulting fully defined game form.
Let us observe that testing whether a three-person game form g is (weakly) totally tight can be done
in polynomial time. In fact, as we shall show in Section 3, property WTT can be tested in polynomial
time (with respect to the size of g) for any n. Therefore, property WTT may be a good candidate for a
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property that we are looking for, a property which can be tested in polynomial time and which implies
assignability. This leads to another results of this paper, namely that weak total tightness implies
assignability of n-person game forms (both partially and fully defined) for all n.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we prove that WTT ⇒ AS for every n, that is,
that property WTT implies assignability for every n. In Section 3 we prove that deciding assignability
of partially defined game forms is NP-complete for n ≥ 3, and that deciding assignability of fully defined
game forms is NP-complete for n ≥ 4. We close the paper by providing further connections to game
theory in Section 4, and by listing some open problems in Section 5.
2 Weak total tightness implies assignability
When dealing with game forms it is sometimes convenient to think of the n-person game form as of an
n-dimensional array and use a geometric interpretation for subarrays. A line in direction i is a set of
strategy profiles (a 1-dimensional subarray) where all coordinates are fixed and only coordinate i is used
as a running index. In game theoretic terms a line in direction i is a 1-dimensional subform obtained by
fixing the strategies of all players except of player i. A hyperplane perpendicular to direction i is a set
of strategy profiles (an (n− 1)-dimensional subarray) where all coordinates are used as running indices
and only coordinate i is fixed. In game theoretic terms a hyperplane perpendicular to direction i is an
(n− 1)-dimensional subform obtained by fixing the strategy of player i.
Definition 1 Given a game form g, a set S ⊆ X of strategy profiles will be called a constant region if
all strategy profiles in S get the same outcome, i.e. if there exists an outcome c ∈ A) such that for all
strategy profiles x ∈ S we have g(x) = c.
Remark 2 We will assume in the remainder of this paper that the game form we are dealing with
contains no constant hyperplane (a hyperplane which is a constant region) and no pair of duplicate
parallel hyperplanes. These assumptions can be made without a loss of generality as such hyperplanes
obviously influence neither total tightness nor assignability of the considered game forms.
Let us also note that for a WTT game form g the entries in any 2 × 2 subarray of g{i} (recall that
g{i} is a two player game form where player i constitutes a one person coalition and all other players
constitute the complementary coalition) can be geometrically thought of as the four intersections of
two arbitrary distinct lines in direction i with two arbitrary distinct (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes
perpendicular to direction i.
Let us start with a simple lemma describing a forbidden substructure for WTT game forms.
Lemma 3 Let g be an n-person game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hj,Hk be two distinct
parallel hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i. Furthermore let ℓi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 be four lines (not
necessarily all distinct) in direction i intersecting Hj in strategy profiles x
i
j, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and intersecting
Hk in strategy profiles x
i
k, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, such that
(1) g(x1j ) 6= g(x
2
j ),
(2) g(x3k) 6= g(x
4
k),
(3) g(xij) 6= g(x
i
k), 1 ≤ i ≤ 4.
Then g is not a WTT game form.
6
g(x4j)
g(x3j)
g(x2j)
g(x1j)
g(x4k)
g(x3k)
g(x2k)
g(x1k)
Hj Hk
ℓ4
ℓ3
ℓ2
ℓ1
6=
6=
6=
6=
6=
6=
Figure 3: A forbidden configuration in WTT game forms as in Lemma 3.
Proof. Using the inequalities (1) and (3) for the quadruple (x1j , x
2
j , x
1
k, x
2
k) we either get a direct con-
tradiction to the WTT property of g or we get g(x1k) = g(x
2
k) = ak for some outcome ak ∈ A. Similarly
using (2) and (3) for the quadruple (x3j , x
4
j , x
3
k, x
4
k) we either get a direct contradiction to the WTT
property of g or we get g(x3j ) = g(x
4
j ) = aj for some outcome aj ∈ A. So let us assume the latter in both
cases. Now using (1) we get that one of g(x1j ), g(x
2
j ) must differ from aj, so let us denote the differing
strategy profile by xuj , for u ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly, using (2) we get g(x
3
k) 6= ak or g(x
4
k) 6= ak and let us
denote the differing strategy profile by xvk, for v ∈ {3, 4}. This altogether implies that the quadruple
(xuj , x
v
j , x
u
k , x
v
k) contradicts the WTT property of g, see Figure 3.
Note that if some of the lines ℓi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 coincide (of course by the assumptions ℓ1 must differ from
ℓ2 and ℓ3 must differ from ℓ4), the proof becomes even simpler. If ℓ1 = ℓ3 and ℓ2 = ℓ4 (or ℓ1 = ℓ4 and
ℓ2 = ℓ3) then the four intersections immediately give a contradiction to the WTT property. If ℓ1 = ℓ3
and ℓ2 6= ℓ4 then the proof above goes through for u = 2 and v = 4. Symmetrically, if ℓ1 6= ℓ3 and
ℓ2 = ℓ4 then the proof above goes through for u = 1 and v = 3.
Let us now define a notation for special hyperplane partitions and state and prove a key property
of these partitions.
Definition 4 Let g be an n-person game form and i an arbitrary direction (player). Let Hj and Hk be
two distinct parallel hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i. For an arbitrary line ℓ in direction i let
us denote by xℓj and x
ℓ
k the strategy profiles at the intersections of line ℓ with hyperplanes Hj and Hk
respectively. We define a partition of Hj into H
=
j (k) and H
6=
j (k) as follows:
H=j (k) = {x
ℓ
j | g(x
ℓ
j) = g(x
ℓ
k)} and H
6=
j (k) = {x
ℓ
j | g(x
ℓ
j) 6= g(x
ℓ
k)}
Lemma 5 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hj,Hk be two
distinct parallel hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i. Then H 6=j (k) is a constant region or H
6=
k (j) is
a constant region (or both are constant regions).
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that neither H 6=j (k) nor H
6=
k (j) is a constant region. This means that
there exist four lines ℓi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 (not necessarily all distinct) in direction i intersecting H 6=j (k) in
strategy profiles xij, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and intersecting H
6=
k (j) in strategy profiles x
i
k, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 such that
(1) g(x1j ) 6= g(x
2
j ) (because H
6=
j (k) contains two distinct outcomes),
(2) g(x3k) 6= g(x
4
k) (because H
6=
k (j) contains two distinct outcomes),
(3) g(xij) 6= g(x
i
k), 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 (by the definition of H
6=
j (k) and H
6=
k (j)).
The four lines ℓi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and their intersections with hyperplanes Hj,Hk obviously fulfil the assump-
tions of Lemma 3 and hence g is not WTT which is a contradiction.
Definition 6 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hj,Hk be
two distinct parallel hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i. If H 6=j (k) is a constant c region for some
outcome c, then we say that Hj dominates Hk by c and denote this fact by Hj
c
−→ Hk. If Hj
c
−→ Hk
and there exists no outcome d such that Hk
d
−→ Hj then we say that Hj strictly dominates Hk by c and
write Hj
c
=⇒ Hk.
Note that Hj
c
=⇒ Hk implies that H
6=
k (j) is not a constant region. Using the just defined notation,
Lemma 5 and the fact that we have no two identical parallel hyperplanes by Remark 2 implies the
following easy corollary.
Corollary 7 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hj,Hk be
two distinct parallel hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i. Then exactly one of the following three
conditions is true
1. Hj
c
=⇒ Hk for some outcome c and there exist two distinct outcomes a 6= b in H
6=
k (j) (which are
both different from c)
2. Hk
d
=⇒ Hj for some outcome d and there exist two distinct outcomes a 6= b in H
6=
j (k) (which are
both different from d)
3. Hj
c
−→ Hk and Hk
d
−→ Hj for some outcomes c 6= d.
Remark 8 It should be noted that Corollary 7 gives a complete characterization of WTT game forms.
Namely, a game form is WTT if and only if any pair of parallel hyperplanes fulfills exactly one of the
three properties specified in Corollary 7. The left to right implications is proved in Lemma 5 while the
reverse implication is trivial.
Now we shall show that a hyperplane cannot strictly dominate two other hyperplanes by two different
outcomes.
Lemma 9 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hℓ,Hj,Hk
three distinct parallel hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i such that Hℓ
c
=⇒ Hj and Hℓ
d
=⇒ Hk for
some outcomes c and d. Then c = d.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that c 6= d. Then, hyperplane Hℓ can be partitioned into three disjoint
regions, namely the constant c region H 6=ℓ (j), a constant d region H
6=
ℓ (k), and region H
=
ℓ (j) ∩ H
=
ℓ (k)
where the outcomes are the same in all three hyperplanes for any perpendicular line in direction i. This
in particular implies that H 6=ℓ (j) ⊆ H
=
ℓ (k) and H
6=
ℓ (k) ⊆ H
=
ℓ (j), see Figure 4.
Now Hℓ
c
=⇒ Hj implies that there exist two distinct lines ℓ1, ℓ2 in direction i intersecting H
6=
ℓ (j)
(and thus also H=ℓ (k)) in profiles x
1
ℓ , x
2
ℓ for which g(x
1
ℓ ) = g(x
2
ℓ ) = c, intersecting H
6=
j (ℓ) in profiles
x1j , x
2
j for which g(x
1
j ) = a1 6= a2 = g(x
2
j ) (here we use the strict domination), and intersecting H
=
k (ℓ)
in profiles x1k, x
2
k for which g(x
1
k) = g(x
2
k) = c. Note that the outcomes a1, a2, c are pairwise distinct.
Similarly, Hℓ
d
=⇒ Hk implies that there exist two distinct lines ℓ3, ℓ4 in direction i intersecting H
6=
ℓ (k)
(and thus also H=ℓ (j)) in profiles x
3
ℓ , x
4
ℓ for which g(x
3
ℓ ) = g(x
4
ℓ ) = d, intersecting H
=
j (ℓ) in profiles x
3
j , x
4
j
for which g(x3j ) = g(x
4
j ) = d, and intersecting H
6=
k (ℓ) in profiles x
3
k, x
4
k for which g(x
3
k) = b1, g(x
3
k) = b2
for b1, b2, d pairwise distinct.
d
d
a2
a1
d
d
c
c
b2
b1
c
c
Hj Hℓ Hk
d
=⇒
c
⇐=
ℓ4
ℓ3
ℓ2
ℓ1


H 6=ℓ (j) ⊆ H
=
ℓ (k)


H 6=ℓ (k) ⊆ H
=
ℓ (j)
6=
6=
6=
6=
6=
6=
=
=
=
=
Figure 4: Strict dominance by two different outcomes c 6= d leads to the forbidden configuration as in
Lemma 3.
It is easy to check that the four pairwise distinct lines ℓi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and their intersections with
hyperplanes Hj,Hk fulfil the assumptions of Lemma 3 and hence g is not WTT which is a contradiction.
Lemma 9 allows us to associate a unique outcome to every hyperplane that strictly dominates at
least one other hyperplane.
Definition 10 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hj be a
hyperplane perpendicular to direction i. If there exists a hyperplane Hk parallel to Hj and an output c
such that Hj
c
=⇒ Hk then we call c the proper outcome of Hj.
Note that a hyperplane Hj that does not strictly dominate any other hyperplane must have the
property (by Corollary 7), that it is dominated (non-strictly or strictly) by every other hyperplane
parallel to Hj. We shall call such a hyperplane for which no proper outcome is defined a sink hyperplane.
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Definition 11 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hj be a
hyperplane perpendicular to direction i. We shall call Hj a sink hyperplane if for every hyperplane Hk,
k 6= j, perpendicular to direction i there exists an outcome ck such that Hk
ck−→ Hj. If there exist no
sink hyperplane in any direction then g is called a no-sink game form.
Definitions 10 and 11 allow us to formulate the following simple corollary.
Corollary 12 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, i an arbitrary direction (player), and Hj be a
hyperplane perpendicular to direction i. Then either Hj has a proper outcome or it is a sink hyperplane.
We will now study no-sink WTT game forms. In such a game form every hyperplane strictly
dominates at least one of its parallel hyperplanes, which in turn implies that there must be a cycle (or
several cycles) of strong dominance relations among all hyperplanes in every direction. Note that such
game forms exist, consider for instance the following 2-person game form
 a a ca b b
c b c

 (3)
in which R1
a
=⇒ R3, R3
c
=⇒ R2, and R2
b
=⇒ R1, where Ri is the i-th row of the game form. The
same cycle of strict dominance holds among the columns C1, C2, and C3 due to the symmetry w.r.t.
the main diagonal. Generating an example for three players is much more difficult to do by hand, but
two such game forms were computer generated using a code of V.Oudalov. Each of them is a 3× 3× 3
array displayed below as a set of three 2-dimensional 3× 3 subarrays (hyperplanes). The first example
is shown in Figure 5.
a
a
a
a
a
a
c
a
a
a
a
a
b
b
a
b
b
a
c
a
a
b
b
a
c
b
c
H1
H2
H3b
⇐=
c
⇐=
a
=⇒
Figure 5: First no-sink 3D example.
Clearly H1
a
=⇒ H3, H3
c
=⇒ H2, and H2
b
=⇒ H1. Note that H3 is exactly the two dimensional
game form from (3) and the relations from there carry over to the row hyperplanes Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 (in
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particular R1
a
=⇒ R3, R3
c
=⇒ R2, and R2
b
=⇒ R1) and due to symmetry also to the column hyperplanes
Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
The second example we have is shown in Figure 6. Note that only H3 is different. We leave the
detection of the three strong dominance cycles in all three directions to the reader. We conjecture, that
no-sink game forms exist for any n, not just for n = 2 and n = 3 as displayed above. Before we start to
study the properties of no-sink WTT game forms let us introduce two definitions.
a
a
a
a
a
a
c
a
a
a
a
a
b
b
a
b
b
a
c
c
c
c
b
c
c
c
c
H1
H2
H3b
⇐=
c
⇐=
a
=⇒
Figure 6: Second no-sink 3D example.
Definition 13 Let g be an n-person WTT game form, x = (x1, . . . , xn) a strategy profile, and i an
arbitrary direction (player). Then Hxi denotes the hyperplane perpendicular to direction i containing
the profile x. That is, Hxi consists of all strategy profiles in g which have the i-th coordinate equal to xi.
Definition 14 Let g be an n-person no-sink WTT game form. We say that g contains a k-box if there
exist two strategy profiles x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn) such that:
1. g(x) 6= g(y),
2. x and y differ in exactly k coordinates i1, . . . , ik (so x and y span a k-dimensional subgame form
of 2k strategy profiles), and
3. for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k it holds that g(x) is not the proper outcome of Hxij and g(y) is not the proper
outcome of Hyij .
Now we are ready to state several properties of no-sink WTT game forms.
Lemma 15 Let g be an n-person no-sink WTT game form which contains a k-box for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Then g contains a (k − 1)-box or a 1-box.
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Proof. Let us assume without a loss of generality that profiles x and y spanning the k-box differ in the
first k coordinates (if not we can permute the coordinates), i.e. x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn)
where xi 6= yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and xi = yi for k+1 ≤ i ≤ n. Now consider direction 1 and strategy profiles
x′ = (y1, x2 . . . , xn) and y
′ = (x1, y2 . . . , yn). Notice that the pairs x, x
′ and y, y′ lie on lines in direction
1 while the pairs x, y′ and x′, y belong to two hyperplanes perpendicular to direction 1 (namely Hx1 and
Hy1 ). Thus the rectangle x, x
′, y, y′ must contain a constant line due to the WTT property. Now we
have four possibilities:
1. if g(x′) = g(y) then x, x′ span a 1-box,
2. if g(x′) = g(x) then y, x′ span a (k − 1)-box,
3. if g(y′) = g(y) then x, y′ span a (k − 1)-box, and
4. if g(y′) = g(x) then y, y′ span a 1-box.
In all four cases the three properties defining the specified 1-box or (k − 1)-box follow easily from the
properties of the k-box. In particular, in the first case g(x) 6= g(x′) = g(y), x and x′ differ only in the
first coordinate, and a pair of parallel hyperplanes Hx1 and H
x′
1 = H
y
1 fulfills the third property. In the
second case g(y) 6= g(x′) = g(x), y and x′ differ in exactly (k − 1) coordinates (namely 2, . . . , k), and
(k − 1) pairs of parallel hyperplanes Hyi and H
x′
i = H
x
i for 2 ≤ i ≤ k fulfill the third property. The
third and fourth case are symmetric.
Lemma 16 Let g be an n-person no-sink WTT game form. Then g contains no 1-box.
Proof. By contradiction let x and y be two profiles spanning a 1-box, i.e. such that
1. g(x) 6= g(y),
2. x and y differ in exactly 1 coordinate, i.e. lie on a line ℓ in some direction i, and
3. g(x) is not the proper outcome of Hxi and g(y) is not the proper outcome of H
y
i .
Let us denote the proper outcome of H1 = H
x
i by a 6= g(x) and the proper outcome of H2 = H
y
i by
b 6= g(y). Since a 6= g(x) 6= g(y) 6= b we can have neither H1
a
=⇒ H2 nor H2
b
=⇒ H1. Consequently, H1
cannot strictly dominate H2 by Lemma 9, since we assumed a to be its proper outcome. Similarly H2
cannot strictly dominate H1. Therefore, by Corollary 7 we must have both H1
g(x)
−→ H2 and H2
g(y)
−→ H1,
see Figure 7.
Hence, there must exist a third hyperplane H3 perpendicular to direction i and distinct from H1,H2
such that H1
a
=⇒ H3. This implies that line ℓ intersects H3 in some strategy profile z with g(z) = g(x),
because x belongs to H=1 (3). Moreover, there must exist two distinct lines ℓ
′ and ℓ′′ in direction i
intersecting H 6=1 (3) in profiles x
′ and x′′ with g(x′) = g(x′′) = a and intersecting H 6=3 (1) in profiles z
′ and
z′′ where g(z′) = c, g(z′′) = d with a, c, d pairwise distinct. One of c, d must be different from g(x) so let
us assume c 6= g(x) = g(z). Let ℓ′ and ℓ′′ intersect H2 in profiles y
′ and y′′. Because H1
g(x)
−→ H2, lines
ℓ′ and ℓ′′ intersect H=1 (2) and so g(y
′) = g(y′′) = a. Now consider the rectangle y, z, z′, y′ on lines ℓ, ℓ′
and in hyperplanes H2,H3. We have g(y) 6= g(z) = g(x), g(z) 6= g(z
′) = c, and c = g(z′) 6= g(y′) = a.
Therefore, WTT property implies g(y) = g(y′) = a. However, now the quadruple y′, y′′, z′, z′′ with
g(y′) = g(y′′) = g(y) = a, g(z′) = c, g(z′′) = d with a, c, d pairwise distinct implies H2
g(y)
=⇒ H3 which
contradicts the fact that the proper outcome of H2 is b 6= g(y).
Lemma 15 and Lemma 16 of course have an obvious corollary.
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g(z′′) = d
g(z′) = c
g(z) = g(x)
g(x′′) = a
g(x′) = a
g(x)
a
a
g(y)
H3 H1 H2
g(x)
−→
g(y)
←−
a
⇐=
ℓ′′
ℓ′
ℓ
=
=
6=
6=
6=
=
6=
6= 6= =
Figure 7: Configuration showing that no 1-box can exists in a WTT game form.
Corollary 17 Let g be an n-person no-sink WTT game form and let k be arbitrary, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then
g contains no k-box.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that g contains a k-box for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Using Lemma 15
we get that g contains a (k− 1)-box or a 1-box, the latter being impossible due to Lemma 16. Iterating
the argument we subsequently get that g contains a (k−2)-box, a (k−3)-box and so on, until we finally
get that g contains a 1-box, which contradicts Lemma 16.
Let us introduce more terminology connected to assignable game forms. Let g be an assignable
n-person game form and gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, functions guaranteeing the assignability of g. Let xi ∈ Xi be a
strategy of player i. If gi(xi) = a for some outcome a, we say that hyperplane H defined by fixing the
strategy of player i to xi is assigned an outcome a. If a hyperplane H is assigned outcome a then we
say that a strategy profile x ∈ H is covered by H if g(x) = a and not covered by H if g(x) 6= a.
Now let us formulate the final statement about no-sink WTT game forms.
Lemma 18 Let g be an n-person no-sink WTT game form. Then g is assignable.
Proof. Let us assign to every hyperplane perpendicular to direction i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (n − 1), its proper
outcome (i.e. all hyperplanes except of those perpendicular to direction n are now assigned). Let H be
a hyperplane perpendicular to direction n and let x, y be two strategy profiles inH which are not covered
by any hyperplane orthogonal to H, i.e. g(x) is not the proper outcome of Hxi for any 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 1),
and g(y) is not the proper outcome of Hyi for any 1 ≤ i ≤ (n − 1). If g(x) 6= g(y) then g contains a
k-box for some 1 ≤ k ≤ (n − 1) where k is the number of coordinates in which x and y differ (they
cannot differ in all n coordinates since they are both in H). However, this is impossible in a WTT game
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form due to Lemma 17, and therefore g(x) = g(y) = a for some a must hold. Since x, y were selected as
arbitrary two not covered strategy profiles, it follows that all not covered profiles in H have the same
outcome a and thus can be covered by assigning a to H. The same can be done for every hyperplane
perpendicular to direction n and hence g is assignable.
It seems quite intuitive, that also every hyperplane perpendicular to direction n, which is assigned
the common outcome of all uncovered profiles, is in fact assigned its proper outcome. We conjecture that
it is indeed the case which would make the statement of the algorithm producing a feasible assignment
much simpler: assign to each hyperplane (in any direction) its proper outcome. However, we currently
have neither a proof of this fact nor a counterexample, so we leave this as an open research question.
Now we are finally ready to state and prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 19 Let g be an n-person WTT game form. Then g is assignable.
Proof. We shall proceed by induction on n. The base case n = 1 is trivial. In this case g is just a
single line which is trivially WTT (there are no 2× 2 submatrices to consider) and which is also easily
assignable (each strategy of the single player is assigned the only outcome belonging to that strategy).
Let us assume for the induction step that the statement of the theorem is true for all (n− 1)-person
WTT game forms and let g be an n-person WTT game form. Now there are two possibilities. Either
g has no sink hyperplane in any direction and then it is assignable by Lemma 18, or there exists a
direction i and a hyperplane Hj perpendicular to i such that Hj is a sink hyperplane. In the latter case
there exists an outcome ck such that Hk
ck−→ Hj for every hyperplane Hk perpendicular to direction i,
k 6= j. We assign ck to Hk for every k 6= j which covers all profiles in H
6=
k (j) regions of the hyperplanes
Hk, k 6= j (the domination Hk
ck−→ Hj implies g(x) = ck for every x ∈ H
6=
k (j)).
It remains to cover profiles in the H=k (j) regions of the hyperplanes Hk, k 6= j, and in hyper-
plane Hj. However, Hj is an (n − 1)-person WTT game form which is assignable by the induction
hypothesis. Moreover, if we extend the assignment of all (n− 2)-dimensional hyperplanes inside of Hj
given by the hypothesis to be the same for the (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes originating from the
(n− 2)-dimensional hyperplanes by adding the coordinate i as a running index (extending the (n− 2)-
dimensional hyperplanes along the lines in direction i) then this extended assignment clearly covers all
profiles in the H=k (j) regions of all hyperplanes Hk, k 6= j. Thus all strategy profiles in g are covered,
which finishes the proof.
Note that the proof of Theorem 19 gives a recursive algorithm constructing a feasible assignment
for an arbitrary n-person WTT game form. That has an impact on the complexity of recognizing the
WTT property and subsequently constructing a feasible assignment for a WTT game form, as we shall
see in the next section.
3 Complexity of recognition of WTT and AS game forms
First let us realize that WTT game forms can be recognized in polynomial time with respect to their
size, i.e. with respect to the total number of strategy profiles. Moreover, let us note that for a WTT
game form a feasible assignment can be constructed in polynomial time as well using the algorithm
implicitly present in the proof of Theorem 19.
Theorem 20 Let g be an n-person game form of size s1× s2× · · · × sn. Let us denote s =
∑n
i=1 si the
sum of sizes in all directions and p =
∏n
i=1 si the product of sizes in all directions, i.e. let p be the total
number of all strategy profiles in g. Then it can be tested in O(np2) time whether g is WTT and in the
affirmative case a feasible assignment for g can be constructed in O(nsp) time.
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Proof. To test the WTT property, it suffices to test for each direction i all 2× 2 subarrays defined by a
choice of two of the p/si distinct lines in direction i and two of the si distinct hyperplanes perpendicular
to direction i. There are O((p/si)
2) pairs of such lines and O((si)
2) pairs of such hyperplanes. Thus
there are O(p2) 2 × 2 subarrays to check for direction i and thus altogether O(np2) subarrays for all
directions (checking each 2× 2 subarray takes of course just a constant time).
Now let us assume that g is WTT. Given two hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i (each con-
taining p/si strategy profiles) it takes O(p/si) time to detect the dominance relation between them.
There are O(s2i ) such pairs of hyperplanes and so it takes O(sip) time to build the dominance graph for
player i. Thus it takes O(sp) time to build the dominance graphs for all players.
In case g is a no-sink game form then, following the proof of Lemma 18, all hyperplanes perpendicular
to directions other than n are assigned their proper outcomes (these outcomes are contained in the
dominance graphs as edge labels). Given a hyperplane H perpendicular to direction n and a profile
x ∈ H it takes O(n) time to check whether it is covered by one of the n−1 already assigned hyperplanes
going through x. Therefore it takes O(np) time to check all profiles and assign outcomes also to
hyperplanes perpendicular to direction n which is dominated by O(sp) time necessary to build the
dominance graphs.
In case g contains a sink hyperplane then, following the proof of Theorem 19, a recursion is invoked.
This recursion has depth at most n and at each level the time needed to build the dominance graphs is
of course dominated by O(sp). Thus the total time needed to get a feasible assignment is O(nsp).
Obviously, the above theorem is valid also for partially defined game forms. Recall that the WTT
property in this case means that all undefined values are all replaced by a single extra outcome and
a WTT property of this fully defined game form is required. Thus the complexity of the recognition
problem is equivalent to the fully defined case. When constructing a feasible assignment for a partially
defined WTT game form using the procedure for the fully defined case, some hyperplanes may be
assigned the extra outcome. This just means that such hyperplanes are not needed to ”cover” the
defined outcomes in the partially defined game form, and hence each of these hyperplanes may be
assigned an arbitrary outcome (instead of the extra outcome) in a feasible assignment of the partially
defined game form.
We have seen above that WTT game forms (fully or partially defined) can be recognized in poly-
nomial time. What is the complexity of recognition for assignable game forms? As we showed in the
previous section, the set of assignable game forms is a superset of WTT game forms. In fact, it is a
strict superset of the WTT ones even in the two dimensional case n = 2. See examples in [4], where
the implication AS ⇒ TT is disproved, or the first example in (1) in the introduction. The next three
subsections show how difficult it is to recognize this strict superset under different additional conditions.
3.1 Complexity of recognition of assignable game forms for n=2
One way to attack the recognition problem is to formulate the assignability of a game form g (both
for the fully defined and partially defined cases) as a CNF satisfiability problem. If we introduce
Boolean variables ykij for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j ∈ Xi, and k ∈ A, where y
k
ij = 1 means gi(j) = k, then
the desired CNF consists of two types of clauses. The first type guarantees for every strategy profile
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X1×· · ·×Xn where g(x) = k that it is ”covered” by one of the separating functions:
(yk1x1 ∨ y
k
2x2 ∨ . . . ∨ y
k
nxn
)
Note that the size of each such clause (the number of literals in it) is given by the dimension of g (by
the number of players), and the number of such clauses is equal to the number of profiles for which g
is defined. The second type of clauses then guarantees that at most one outcome from A is assigned to
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every gi(j), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j ∈ Xi: ∧
k 6=ℓ∈A
(ykij ∨ y
ℓ
ij)
These clauses are all quadratic (two literals per clause). It is not necessary to require that exactly
one outcome is assigned to every gi(j) (requiring at most one outcome suffices), because any partially
defined feasible assignment can be of course arbitrarily completed to a fully defined one.
Note, that for n = 2 the above formulation yields a 2-SAT instance (all clauses are quadratic), which
immediately implies that the assignability of a two-person game form (partially or fully defined) can be
recognized (and a feasible assignment constructed, if it exists) in polynomial time with respect to the
size of the game form. On the other hand, given a fully defined n-person game form g with n ≥ 3, the
complexity of recognizing whether g is assignable is not known. We shall address this problem in the
rest of this section. First we shall show that for partially defined game forms the recognition problem
is NP-complete for n ≥ 3. Then we will modify this proof to show that for fully defined game forms the
recognition problem is NP-complete for n ≥ 4, leaving the case n = 3 open.
3.2 Complexity of recognition of partially defined assignable game forms for n ≥ 3
In this subsection we show that recognizing assignable partially defined n-person game forms is NP-
complete already for n = 3. This problem is obviously in NP (for any n) as checking a feasibility of a
given assignment can be easily done in polynomial time with respect to the size of the game form. The
hardness part is proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 21 It is NP-hard to recognize, whether a given partially defined 3-person game form is
assignable or not.
Proof. We will proceed by constructing a reduction from the known NP-hard problem 3-SAT, a satisfia-
bility of CNFs with exactly three literals per clause, where we also assume without any loss of generality
that no clause contains two literals of the same variable. Let
Φ =
m∧
i=1
Ci =
m∧
i=1
(ui ∨ vi ∨ wi)
be an instance of 3-SAT, i.e. a 3-CNF on variables x1, . . . , xn where each ui, vi, and wi is a positive or
a negative occurrence of some variable. We associate outcomes c1, . . . , cm with the clauses C1, . . . , Cm
of Φ and define a partially defined 3-person game form gΦ. It consists of an m×m×m box B, where
gΦ(i, i, i) = ci, i.e. box B contains the outcomes c1, . . . , cm on its main diagonal and it is undefined
everywhere else. Let us denote H11 , . . . ,H
1
m the hyperplanes perpendicular to direction 1, and similarly
for directions 2 and 3. Box B serves as a “selector”. The fact that hyperplane H1i is assigned outcome
ci means that clause Ci is satisfied by literal ui (the literal ui gets value true), and similarly for H
2
i and
vi and also H
3
i and wi. Clearly, B by itself is assignable in many ways - each strategy profile on the
main diagonal of B can be covered by any of the three hyperplanes incident with it. However, not every
such assignment corresponds to a truth assignment to variables x1, . . . , xn as it disregards the fact that
two distinct literals may share the same variable. To establish a one-to-one correspondence between
feasible assignments of gΦ and satisfying truth assignments of Φ we will add “gadgets” to the box B
which will guarantee that:
1. If ui = uj for i 6= j, i.e. both literals are two occurrences of the same variable with the same
polarity, then either H1i is assigned ci and simultaneously H
1
j is assigned cj (both ui and uj are
true), or neither H1i is assigned ci nor H
1
j is assigned cj (both ui and uj are false). Similarly for
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vi = vj and wi = wj. In each of these three cases we need to force the assigned outcomes in the
above described way for a pair of parallel hyperplanes.
2. If ui = vj for i 6= j, i.e. both literals are two occurrences of the same variable with the same
polarity, then either H1i is assigned ci and simultaneously H
2
j is assigned cj (both ui and uj are
true), or neither H1i is assigned ci nor H
2
j is assigned cj (both ui and uj are false). Similarly for
ui = wj and vi = wj. In each of these three cases we need to force the assigned outcomes in the
above described way for a pair of perpendicular hyperplanes.
3. If ui = uj for i 6= j, i.e. both literals are two occurrences of the same variable with complementary
polarities, then either H1i is assigned ci or H
1
j is assigned cj but not both (exactly one of ui and uj
is true and exactly one false). Similarly for vi = vj and wi = wj . In each of these three cases we
need to force the assigned outcomes in the above described way for a pair of parallel hyperplanes.
4. If ui = vj for i 6= j, i.e. both literals are two occurrences of the same variable with complementary
polarities, then either H1i is assigned ci or H
2
j is assigned cj but not both (exactly one of ui and
vj is true and exactly one false). Similarly for ui = wj and vi = wj . In each of these three cases
we need to force the assigned outcomes in the above described way for a pair of perpendicular
hyperplanes.
Each such gadget will add a constant number of “dedicated” hyperplanes outside of box B, where
“dedicated” means that no two gadgets share a common added hyperplane (of course they may share
hyperplanes incident to box B). Since the number of the above pair-wise relations is at most quadratic
in the size of Φ, the constructed game form gΦ has a polynomial size with respect to the size of Φ.
Before constructing the four types of gadgets with above described properties, let us construct
common “forcing” components of such gadgets (called forcing cubes). These are 2 × 2× 2 arrays with
six distinct outcomes a, b, c, d, e, f arranged in the eight corners (strategy profiles) of the array in one
of the two possible ways shown in Figure 8.
d
a
a
c
f
b
b
e
a
b
d
a
a
c
b
e
f
b
a
b
Figure 8: Two forcing cubes: Here we assume that a, b, c d, e, and f are six distinct outcomes. Since
they are covered by six planes, both copies of a must be covered by the front plane, and both copies of
b must be covered by the back plane. Consequently, we must have a assigned to the front and b to the
back planes in all feasible assignments.
In both forcing cubes there are six hyperplanes to cover all eight corners with six distinct outcomes.
Thus, both a outcomes must be covered by the same hyperplane and so do both b outcomes. Hence, in
both forcing cubes the front hyperplane is forced to be assigned a and the back hyperplane is forced to
be assigned b in any feasible assignment.
Let us now construct the four types of required gadgets.
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1. Let ui = uj. Let us add two hyperplanes H
2
ℓ and H
2
ℓ+1 perpendicular to direction 2 and two
hyperplanes H3k and H
3
k+1 perpendicular to direction 3 for some k, ℓ > m. Let us consider four
distinct outcomes a, b, d, e not contained among c1, . . . , cm, and the 2× 2× 2 array defined by the
intersections of the four added hyperplanes with H1i and H
2
i as in Figure 9.
ci
a
a
cj
b
d
e
b
H1i H
1
j
H2ℓ
H2ℓ+1
H3k+1
H3k
b
a
Figure 9: Gadget 1: This is an instance of one of the forcing cubes, thus assignments a→ H3k and b→
H3k+1 are implied in any feasible assignment. These leave only two possible cyclic feasible assignments
for the remaining four planes. Either ci → H
1
i , d→ H
2
ℓ , cj → H
1
j and e→ H
2
ℓ+1, or d→ H
1
i , cj → H
2
ℓ ,
e → H1j and ci → H
2
ℓ+1. Consequently, in all feasible assignments we have either both ci → H
1
i and
cj → H
1
j or we have neither one, simultaneously.
This gadget is a forcing cube which forces H3k to be assigned a and H
3
k+1 to be assigned b. Now
there are only two ways how the remaining four hyperplanes can cover the four distinct outcomes
ci, cj , d, e. If H
1
i is assigned ci, it forces H
2
ℓ to be assigned d, which in turn forces H
1
j to be assigned
cj , which finally forces H
2
ℓ+1 to be assigned e. On the other hand, if H
1
i is assigned d, it forces
H2ℓ+1 to be assigned ci, which in turn forces H
1
j to be assigned e, which finally forces H
2
ℓ to be
assigned cj . Thus the constructed gadget fulfills exactly the required properties. Note also, that
the hyperplanes H1i ,H
1
j which are incident to the selector box B are forced to be assigned one of
the outcomes ci, cj , d, e in every feasible assignment.
2. Let ui = vj . Let us add one hyperplane H
1
ℓ perpendicular to direction 1, one hyperplane H
2
p
perpendicular to direction 2, and two hyperplanes H3k and H
3
k+1 perpendicular to direction 3 for
some k, ℓ, p > m. Let us consider four distinct outcomes a, b, d, e not contained among c1, . . . , cm
and the 2 × 2 × 2 array defined by the intersections of the four added hyperplanes with H1i and
H2j . We assign the outcomes to this 2× 2× 2 array as in Figure 10.
This is again a forcing cube which forces H3k to be assigned a and H
3
k+1 to be assigned b. Clearly,
either H1i is assigned ci and H
2
j is assigned cj or alternatively H
1
i is assigned cj and H
2
j is assigned
ci (and the outcomes d and e are similarly covered by H
1
ℓ and H
2
p in one of the two possible
ways). Thus the constructed gadget fulfills exactly the required properties. Note also, that the
hyperplanes H1i ,H
2
j which are incident to the selector box B are forced to be assigned one of the
outcomes ci, cj in every feasible assignment.
3. Let ui = uj . Let us add two hyperplanes H
1
ℓ and H
1
ℓ+1 perpendicular to direction 1, two hyper-
planesH2p andH
2
p+1 perpendicular to direction 2, and two hyperplanesH
3
k andH
3
k+1 perpendicular
to direction 3 for some k, ℓ, p > m. Let us assign six distinct outcomes a, b, c, d, e, f not contained
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aci
d
a
b
cj
e
b
H1i H
1
ℓ
H2j
H2p
H3k+1
H3k
b
a
Figure 10: Gadget 2: This is an instance of one of the forcing cubes, thus assignments a → H3k and
b → H3k+1 are implied in any feasible assignment. These leave only two possible feasible assignments
for H1i and H
2
j . We have either ci → H
1
i and cj → H
2
j , or cj → H
1
i and ci → H
2
j . Consequently, in all
feasible assignments we have either both ci → H
1
i and cj → H
2
j or we have neither one, simultaneously.
among c1, . . . , cm to the 2× 2× 2 array defined by the intersections of the six added hyperplanes
in such a way that we get a forcing cube which forces H3k to be assigned outcome a. Let us add
two more hyperplanes H2p+2 and H
2
p+3 perpendicular to direction 2 and consider the intersections
of H3k with H
1
i , H
1
j , H
2
p+2, and H
2
p+3. Let us assign outcomes to this 2× 2 subarray as in Figure
11.
Since H3k is forced to be assigned outcome a, there are just two ways how to cover the four
outcomes in this 2 × 2 subarray. Either H1i is assigned ci, H
2
p+3 is assigned e, H
1
j is assigned f ,
and H2p+2 is assigned cj , or alternatively H
1
i is assigned e, H
2
p+2 is assigned ci, H
1
j is assigned
cj , and H
2
p+3 is assigned f . Thus the constructed gadget fulfills exactly the required properties.
Note also, that the hyperplanes H1i ,H
1
j which are incident to the selector box B are forced to be
assigned one of the outcomes ci, cj , e, f in every feasible assignment.
4. Let ui = vj . Let us add two hyperplanes H
1
ℓ and H
1
ℓ+1 perpendicular to direction 1, two hyper-
planesH2p andH
2
p+1 perpendicular to direction 2, and two hyperplanesH
3
k andH
3
k+1 perpendicular
to direction 3 for some k, ℓ, p > m. Let us assign six distinct outcomes a, b, c, d, e, f not contained
among c1, . . . , cm to the 2×2×2 array defined by the intersections of the six added hyperplanes in
such a way, that we get a forcing cube which forces H3k to be assigned outcome a. Let us add one
more hyperplane H1ℓ+2 perpendicular to direction 1 and one more hyperplane H
2
p+2 perpendicular
to direction 2 and consider the intersections of H3k with H
1
i , H
2
j , H
1
ℓ+2, and H
2
p+2. Let us assign
outcomes to this 2× 2 subarray as in Figure 12.
Since H3k is forced to be assigned outcome a, there are just two ways how to cover the four
outcomes in this 2 × 2 subarray. Either H1i is assigned ci, H
2
j is assigned e, H
1
ℓ+2 is assigned cj ,
and H2p+2 is assigned f , or alternatively H
1
i is assigned e, H
2
p+2 is assigned ci, H
1
ℓ+2 is assigned
f , and H2j is assigned cj . Thus the constructed gadget fulfills exactly the required properties.
Note also, that the hyperplanes H1i ,H
2
j which are incident to the selector box B are forced to be
assigned one of the outcomes ci, cj , e, f in every feasible assignment.
It follows from the above constructions that if there exists a feasible assignment to game form gΦ
then Φ has a satisfying assignment. Indeed, the feasibility of the assignment for the strategy profiles on
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Figure 11: Gadget 3: In this gadget we have a forcing cube disjoint from the hyperplanes incident with
the selector box, implying that a is assigned to H3k in all feasible assignments. The intersection of this
hyperplane with four others, as in the picture above, reduces the possible feasible assignments to the
cases when either ci is assigned to H
1
i or cj is assigned to H
1
j , but not both.
the main diagonal of the selector box implies that each clause has a satisfying literal, and the feasibility
of the assignment in the strategy profiles of the gadgets imply that these truth values are consistent.
Conversely, if we have a satisfying truth assignment to Φ, then we can derive a feasible assignment
to all hyperplanes H1i , H
2
j and H
3
k which cover the strategy profiles along the diagonal of the selector
box, and extend these to cover all other strategy profiles by the proven properties of the gadgets.
3.3 Complexity of recognition of fully defined assignable game forms for n ≥ 4
In this subsection we will modify the proof of Theorem 21 to show that the recognition problem is
NP-complete also for fully defined game forms, this time for n ≥ 4, leaving the case n = 3 open.
Theorem 22 It is NP-hard to recognize, whether a given fully defined 4-person game form is assignable
or not.
Proof. Let us repeat the construction from the proof of Theorem 21 with these changes:
• All strategy profiles which were undefined in the construction now get a new additional outcome
∗, which produces a fully defined game form.
• If the construction produced a 3-person game form of size s1× s2× s3 we shall consider it now as
a 4-person game form of size s1 × s2 × s3 × 1, and denote the single hyperplane perpendicular to
the added direction H41 .
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Figure 12: Gadget 4: In this gadget we have a forcing cube disjoint from the hyperplanes incident with
the selector box, implying that a is assigned to H3k in all feasible assignments. The intersection of this
hyperplane with four others, as in the picture above, reduces the possible feasible assignments to the
cases when either ci is assigned to H
1
i or cj is assigned to H
1
j , but not both.
• We shall assume that the input 3-CNF Φ satisfies the following additional property: if we delete
any two clauses from Φ, the remaining 3-CNF contains some clause Ci with a non-trivial literal in
the first position, clause Cj with a non-trivial literal in the second position, and clause Ck with a
non-trivial literal in the third position, where a trivial literal is a literal which represents the only
occurrence of its variable in the entire formula. This assumption can be made without losing the
NP-hardness of the 3-SAT problem restricted to such inputs. Let us first note that we can assume
that every variable appears at least twice in two different clauses of the input 3-CNF. Otherwise,
we can fix the value of the unique appearance without changing satisfiability of the input. We
claim that a 3-CNF that does not satisfy the property claimed above, and that has every variable
appearing at least twice, cannot have more than 10 clauses. To see this let us assume that by
deleting the first two clauses we have a trivial literal in each of the remaining clauses. All of the
variables of these trivial literals must have then their second appearance in the deleted clauses,
that is we cannot have more than 6 such trivial literals. Therefore, if we have at least 11 clauses,
then we must have three such that they do not involve trivial literals in any positions.
Now it is clear that any feasible assignment of outcomes to hyperplanes in the proof of Theorem 21
can be extended to a feasible assignment of outcomes to hyperplanes for the fully defined game form
by assigning outcome ∗ to H41 . Now we shall show the other direction, i.e. prove, that the assignment
of outcome ∗ to H41 is forced, i.e. there is no feasible assignment of outcomes to hyperplanes of the
4-person game form in which H41 is assigned something else. This will in turn prove, that any feasible
assignment of the fully defined 4-person game form defines a feasible assignment for the partially defined
3-person game form which is obtained by deleting all ∗ outcomes and considering the three dimensional
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projection by deleting the fourth coordinate (which is always 1 for all strategy profiles). Consequently,
the feasible assignments of the fully defined 4-person game form correspond to satisfying assignments
of the input 3-CNF Φ in the same manner as in the proof of Theorem 21.
Let us therefore assume by contradiction that H41 is assigned an outcome z different from outcome
∗. We have two possible cases. Either z = cℓ for some 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m or z is one of the added outcomes
participating in a gadget designed to force values for hyperplanes incident to some ci and cj in the
selector box B. Now let us consider three clauses Cp, Cq, Cr all different from Cℓ in the first case,
or different from both Ci and Cj in the second case such that literals up, vq, wr are nontrivial. Such
clauses and literals exist due to the additional assumption on Φ stated above. This implies, that in any
feasible assignment the hyperplane H1p is forced to be assigned either cp or one of the added outcomes
participating in the corresponding gadget (which are all different from z), and similarly for H2q and H
3
r .
Now observe, that the strategy profile x at the intersection of H1p , H
2
q , and H
3
r lies inside the selector
box B and outside its main diagonal (we assumed that p, q, r are not all equal). Thus we have g(x) = ∗,
and x can be covered by neither H1p , nor H
2
q , nor H
3
r , nor H
4
1 . Therefore, no feasible assignment that
assigns to H41 an outcome different from ∗ can exist.
4 Further connections with game theory
In [4], the following six classes of game forms were considered: tight (T ), totally tight (TT ), Nash-
solvable (NS), dominance-solvable (DS), acyclic (AC), and assignable (AS). The classes AS, T , and
TT were introduced in the previous sections. As for the remaining three classes, AC, NS, and DS, we
refer the reader to, for example, [14, 15, 4, 1, 13], where these properties are introduced both for the
two-person case and for the general n-person case.
It was shown in [4] that for the two-person case the following implications hold
AS ⇐ TT ⇔ AC ⇒ DS ⇒ NS ⇔ T. (4)
In fact, the last three implications, DS ⇒ NS ⇔ T , were obtained long ago; see [14, 15, 6] and
[7, 8, 9], respectively. Furthermore, AC ⇒ TT is obvious; see [11, 13] or [4]. The remaining three
implications for n = 2, that is that TT ⇒ AS, TT ⇒ DS, and TT ⇒ AC constitute the main results
of [4]. The first two of them were conjectured by Kukushkin ([11, 12], he uses the term “separability”
instead of “assignability” [13]); the last one was proven independently in [11] and [4]. All three of the
above implications can easily be derived from the recursive characterization of the TT two-person game
forms obtained in [4]. Let us also mention that TT ⇒ NS easily follows from Shapley’s theorem [16],
although it was not explicitly claimed there, as [16] deals with zero-sum games and their saddle points,
rather than with Nash-solvable game forms. Finally, let us note that, except for those given in (4), no
other implications hold between the considered six classes of game forms. The corresponding examples
to all invalid implications can be found in [4].
It was shown in [4] that totally tight two-person game forms are also assignable. Checking whether
a two-person game form is TT can be done in polynomial time, as there is only a polynomial number of
2× 2 subforms to check (this easy fact was observed e.g. in [1] and generalized to n-person game forms
for any n in Section 3 of this paper). This of course also applies to checking AC, since this property is
in the two-person case equivalent to TT. Recognizing whether a two-person game form is AS requires a
more complicated argument, but as we have seen in Section 3 this can be done in polynomial time for
n = 2 and it is hard for n ≥ 4.
Only a few relations are known between the properties of higher dimensional game forms. Moulin
[15] proved that the implications DS ⇒ NS and DS ⇒ T hold for every n, while AC ⇒ NS is trivial.
However, tightness and Nash-solvability are no longer related, that is, both implications in NS ⇔ T
22
fail already for n = 3. In [7], ⇐ was disproved, while ⇒ mistakenly claimed; then, in [9] it was shown
that both implications fail already for n = 3.
In [1], it was demonstrated that for n ≥ 3 total tightness implies neither dominance-solvability nor
acyclicity. Both implications, TT ⇒ AC and TT ⇒ DS, fail already for n = 3, as shown by a single
example in the last section of [1]. Moreover, the same example disproves the conjecture from [11] stating
that a game form is acyclic if all of its subforms are Nash-solvable. However, TT ⇒ NS, still holds for
n = 3 (this is the main result of [1]), while the case n > 3 remains open.
This last result is interesting for the following reason: while testing whether a three-person game
form g is Nash-solvable is computationally difficult, testing whether g is (weakly) totally tight can be
done in polynomial time as we have seen in Section 3.
5 Conclusions and plans for future research
This paper presents two main results for (partially defined) n-person game forms:
1. If a partially defined n-person game form is weakly totally tight (which is a condition verifiable in
polynomial time) then the game form is assignable, and there is a polynomial time combinatorial
algorithm constructing a feasible assignment.
2. It is NP-complete to decide whether a partially defined n-person game form is assignable for any
fixed n ≥ 3, and the same is true for fully defined n-person game forms for any fixed n ≥ 4 .
The first result of course holds also for fully defined WTT n-person game forms as these can be viewed
as a subclass of the partially defines ones. The proofs of the second result assume that the number of
outcomes |A| is an input parameter. The complexity of recognition of assignable game forms for a fixed
number of outcomes remains open, in particular it remains open for the interesting case |A| = n + 1
(where n is the number of players), which is the minimal number of outcomes for which non-assignable
game forms exist. This case seems to be difficult, even when the last outcome appears only once. Besides
of this open question, the paper introduced three conjectures concerning assignability of game forms.
• No-sink WTT game forms exists for any number of players.
• For a no-sink game form, assigning the proper outcome for all hyperplanes is a feasible assignment.
• Recognizing assignability of fully defined game forms of three players is NP-hard.
For the two-person case, the equalities and containments of (4) summarize the relations between the
corresponding six classes of game forms. Furthermore, there are no others, that is, all containments not
shown by (4) fail. These results are obtained in [4] and are based on a complete recursive characterization
of the TT two-person game forms. The six properties of (4) are defined for any n. Moreover, for n ≥ 4
the concepts of tightness and total tightness appear in two versions T ,WT and TT ,WTT . By definition,
T ⇒WT and TT ⇒WTT .
It is a natural idea to extend the results for n = 2 to the general n-person case and complete the
diagram of containments between the considered 8 classes of game forms. A possible plan is to obtain
a recursive characterization of the n-person TT and WTT game forms and derive from it the main
properties (containments) for this class in a similar manner as was done in [4] for the case n = 2.
23
Acknowledgement
The first author thanks for partial support the National Science Foundation (Grant IIS-1161476). This
work was partially done while the second author was a visiting professor at RUTCOR and he thanks
RUTCOR for the generous support he has received. He also acknowledges the support of the Czech
Science Foundation (Grant 15-15511S-P202). The research of the third author was partially funded by
the Russian Academic Excellence Project ’5-100’. We are also thankful to Igor Zverovich who suggested
the equivalent reformulation of total tightness of Lemma 5, to Vladimir Oudalov whose code was used
to get the two examples in Figures 5 and 6, and to Nikolai Kukushkin who brought our attention to
the concepts of acyclicity and assignability of game forms in his talk at RUTCOR in February 2008.
References
[1] E. Boros, O. Cˇepek, and V. Gurvich, Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game
forms, Discrete Mathematics 312:8 (2012) 1436–1443.
[2] E. Boros, O. Cˇepek, V. Gurvich, K. Makino, I.E. Zverovich, Separable discrete functions, RUTCOR
Research Report, RRR-26-2009, Rutgers University.
[3] E. Boros, V. Gurvich, P.L. Hammer, T. Ibaraki, and A. Kogan, Decomposability of partially defined
Boolean functions, Discrete Applied Math. 62 (1995) 51–75.
[4] E. Boros, V. Gurvich, K. Makino, and D. Papp, Acyclic, or totally tight, two-person game forms;
a characterization and main properties; Discrete Mathematics, 310 (6-7) (2010) 1135–1151.
[5] M. Fredman, and L. Khachiyan. On the Complexity of Dualization of Monotone Disjunctive Normal
Forms, J. Algorithms, 21 (3) (1996) 618-628.
[6] A.I. Golberg and V.A. Gurvich, Sincere and stable social choice, VINITI (Ins. Sci. and Engin.
Inform.) Microfilm 3181 (1986) 31 pages (in Russian).
[7] V. Gurvich, Solution of positional games in pure strategies, USSR Comput. Math. and Math. Phys.
15 (2) (1975) 74-87.
[8] V. Gurvich, Applications of Boolean functions and contact schemes in game theory, Ph.D. Thesis,
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (1978) 110 pp. (in Russian).
[9] V. Gurvich, Equilibrium in pure strategies, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 38 (3) (1988) 597-602.
[10] V. Gurvich Decomposing complete edge-chromatic graphs and hypergraphs, revisited, Discrete
Applied Math. 157 (2009) 3069–3085.
[11] N.S. Kukushkin, Shapley’s ”2 by 2” theorem for game forms, Economics Bulletin 3 (33) (2007) 1–5.
[12] N. S. Kukushkin, private communications; RUTCOR seminar, February 2008.
[13] N.S. Kukushkin Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms, International Journal of Game
Theory 40 (2011) 147–177.
[14] H.Moulin, Dominance-solvable voting schemes, Econometrica 47 (1979) 1337-1351.
[15] H.Moulin, The strategy of social choice. North-Holland Publ. Co, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford,
1983.
24
[16] L.S.Shapley, Some topics in two-person games, in Advances in Game Theory, M.Drescher,
L.S.Shapley, and A.W.Tucker, eds., Annals of Mathematical Studies, AM52, Princeton Univer-
sity Press (1964) 1-28.
25
